Friday, February 8, 2013

Follow The Bots And Sceeto Live Emini Trading Room Launching Daily repor...

If you trade the S&P 500 Emini Futures, or trade the Nasdaq, Dow Jones, Rusell mini futures, or if you trade Forex and Crude Oil you need to check out for one of the worlds most advanced indicators. A no obligation Free Trial is 
 Follow The Bots And Sceeto Live Emini Trading Room Launching Daily report 8th Feb 2013. With the huge snowstorm on the east Coast of the United States today it was a slow day in the markets as a lot of traders cashed out early to beat the snow home.
Please review our recent video examples of some of our trade setups that we posted earlier in the week you will learn quite a bit about sceeto and how it works.
Why not also register for a free trial of sceeto at . Also if you want to register your interest in receiving more info about our live Emini trade room and the setups we will be providing daily then send us an email at sceeto membership is limited so do email earlier rather than later.
It's a very unique room as it uses our high frequency trading algorithms and software along with market profile and auction market theory to pick great trades for you. We assist you in catching moves and want to get you as many points as possible, ticks are fine but we want our mebers to make many points profit each day.
So check out our live Emini trading room we are sure you will love it.

tect courtesy of Wikipedia creative commons licence
Auction theory is an applied branch of economics which deals with how people act in auction markets and researches the properties of auction markets. There are many possible designs (or sets of rules) for an auction and typical issues studied by auction theorists include the efficiency of a given auction design, optimal and equilibrium bidding strategies, and revenue comparison. Auction theory is also used as a tool to inform the design of real-world auctions; most notably auctions for the privatisation of public-sector companies or the sale of licenses for use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Game-theoretic models of auctions and strategic bidding generally fall into either of the following two categories. In a private value model, each participant (bidder) assumes that each of the competing bidders obtains a random private value from a probability distribution. In a common value model, each participant assumes that any other participant obtains a random signal from a probability distribution common to all bidders. Usually, but not always, a private values model assumes that the values are independent across bidders, whereas a common value model usually assumes that the values are independent up to the common parameters of the probability distribution.
Ex-post equilibrium in a simple auction market.

When it is necessary to make explicit assumptions about bidders' value distributions, most of the published research assumes symmetric bidders. This means that the probability distribution from which the bidders obtain their values (or signals) is identical across bidders. In a private values model which assumes independence, symmetry implies that the bidders' values are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.).

An important example (which does not assume independence) is Milgrom and Weber's "general symmetric model" (1982).[2][3] One of the earlier published theoretical research addressing properties of auctions among asymmetric bidders is Keith Waehrer's 1999 article.[4] Later published research include Susan Athey's 2001 Econometrica article,[5] as well as Reny and Zamir (2004).[6]